Abstract
INTRODUCTION
An earlier paper by the author notes that analysis and interpretation of network traffic is increasingly important to the digital forensics community. Network data --live traffic, stored communications, or server logs --contain information that might be of use to the digital investigator, either for information security incident response, forensics applications, research purposes, or intelligence gathering. There is, in fact, so much potentially valuable information in system log files that due diligence requires the investigator to look at as much of this information as possible and the sheer volume makes it nearly impossible to examine every source of data in every case (Kessler & Fasulo, 2007) .
There are a variety of sources and types of network information that can be gathered, including (Casey, 2004; Nikkel, 2005) :
• Intrusion detection system (IDS) and firewall logs This paper is intended to provide an overview of several aspects of protocol analysis for a computer forensics examiner with a good foundation in basic networking. First, it is meant as an introduction to normal and abnormal TCP/IP traffic. Second, it is intended to demonstrate the use of a packet sniffer, which can be an important tool for network-based examinations or incident response. The examples here use output from tcpdump and WinDump, both command line packet sniffing tools. (A brief guide on their use can be found in the appendix). The paper will, hopefully, spark an interest in a deeper understanding of the internal workings of network protocols and the application of protocol analysis.
1 Also affiliated with Edith Cowan University, Mount Lawley, Western Australia.
After the three-way handshake, the listing shows the server sending 64 bytes of data (Line 6); this is undoubtedly the banner message, welcome message, and login request. The client sends back an acknowledgement (Line 7) and some additional information (Line 8), and the exchange of data begins (Line 9).
The last four lines in the listing (Lines 10-13) show the termination of the TCP connection. Think of the bidirectional TCP logical connection as two unidirectional connections and the termination scenario then makes sense; each host sends the other a segment with the finish (FIN) flag set and the receiver responds by acknowledging the FIN. After the two pairs of FIN/ACK segments are exchanged, the logical connection is terminated. 
Listing 1
It is relatively straight-forward for users to learn how the protocols used on the Internet operate --install protocol analysis software (e.g., WireShark), turn it on, perform a single function on the network (e.g., download a Web page, send and retrieve e-mail, or logon to an FTP server), stop the protocol analyzer, and save the captured packets. Study of this set of packet traces can teach a lot about the normal operation of the protocols. Trying this on different operating systems can also be quite illuminating; ping and traceroute, for example, operate noticeably differently on Linux and Windows system.
4
Abnormal and other interesting traffic can also be obtained by using so-called hacker tools (e.g., port scanners) and/or applications that allow the user to craft their own packets (e.g., hping2). In this way, users can learn some of the patterns of abnormal traffic and the signatures (or syndromes) of suspicious events.
It is important to note that while the actual attacks on systems often employ bogus or spoofed IP addresses, nearly all such network attacks are preceded by some form of reconnaissance. Thus, at some point in time, probing traffic using a real IP address pointing to the attacker must have been employed. It is necessary to locate that traffic in order to trace an attack back to its roots.
The remainder of this section will show some packet listings of TCP/IP traffic, provide a discussion of the main points of interest, and introduce network intrusion signature detection and analysis (Northcutt, Cooper, et al., 2001; Northcutt, Novak, & McLachlan, 2001 Listing 2 The different responses might be expected since holmes and watson are different computers. But they are also different operating systems; the former is Linux and the latter is Windows. Although IP and TCP are standardized protocols, there are no standardized implementations. Sending segments with many different types of requested options and/or TCP flag settings is one way in which a host can perform operating system fingerprinting of another host; the way in which a host responds to both normal and abnormal events gives a clue as to the type of operating system.
Scenario #3 6
Listing 3 shows a large number of UDP datagrams sent from the host holmes to host alabaster.champlain.edu; there are also several Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Port Unreachable responses from alabaster. What is happening here is a UDP port scan, where holmes is trying to determine which UDP ports in the range 130-140 are listening (i.e., open) on alabaster. Due to the nature of UDP, no response to a probe on a given port might mean that the port is closed; an ICMP Port Unreachable message definitely means that the port is closed. In this case, holmes tries three times to connect to this set of UDP ports on alabaster unless it gets some sort of response. Listing 3 6 Netbios-ns, netbios-dgm, and netbios-ssn are the names of the services associated with UDP ports 137, 138, and 139, respectively.
Scenario #4 7
Listing 4A shows a series of TCP packets from host holmes to host watson (responses from watson are not shown).
Close examination of the packets show that these are all the first part of TCP's three-way handshake and they are all sent in less than 0.01 seconds. Furthermore, although the source and destination ports appear to be in quasi-random order, the reader will observe that if the segments are rearranged in sequential order by the source port, the destination ports are also in sequential order.
What we have here is a classic TCP port scan using a set of TCP ports from a user-defined list. Listing 4B
Scenario #5
Listing 5 shows a number of segments from host foo.example.com to a series of hosts on the 172. 16.0.0 and 192.168.0.0 subnets, all probing port 23 (telnet) . What is odd about these packets is that foo uses the same source port number (45820) when attempting a connection with the 192.168.0.0 hosts and the same port number (52526) when attempting to connect to a 172.16.0.0 host. In addition, note that these connection attempts all include four bytes of data. Although nothing in the TCP specification prohibits the transmission of data during the three-way handshake, it is very unusual to see data during connection setup. The TCP specification suggests that such data be buffered and not processed until after the connection is completed although this is a way to slip data past filtering and logging in weak implementations. Listing 5
Scenario #6
Listing 6A shows two sets of connection attempts to port 22 (Secure Shell, SSH) at host watson; the first from host state.example.net and the next from foo.example.com. This is a sequence of connection attempts and retries, evidenced by the fact that both state and foo repeatedly try to connect using the same source port number (1739 and 62555, respectively). In this case, watson is busy and does not respond to any of the connection attempts.
It is interesting, however, to look at the timing of the connection requests. The host state tries to connect to watson; after no response, it tries again three more times waiting roughly 1.5 seconds between each attempt. The host foo is not so persistent; after failing to connect the first time, it waits roughly 3 seconds to try again, then 6 seconds for the third attempt, and then 12 seconds for the final attempt. Clearly, foo's implementers decided that if a connection could not be achieved at a given moment, the destination host might actually be busy.
In this case, state is a Windows system and foo is a Linux system. Listing 6B
Scenario #7
Listing 7A demonstrates tcpdump's ability to filter the display; in this case, it will only show messages associated with the ICMP protocol. This listing shows a series of Echo Reply messages and there are several noteworthy items.
Echo Reply messages are commonly used with the Ping command, where one host sends an ICMP Echo message containing a string of characters to another host and the receiving host responds with an Echo Reply message repeating the same string of characters. The listing below displays both directions of ICMP traffic; it is highly suspicious to see a series of outgoing Echo Replies with no incoming Echo messages.
Another interesting aspect of the listing is the timing of the messages. The second message follows the first by approximately 10 seconds, followed by another message 51 seconds later, and the pattern of 10 second and 51 second interval pairs seems to continue. This is clearly the action of some automated process and not of a human.
[root@altamont gck]# tcpdump 'icmp'
Listing 7B uses a tcpdump switch to display the data in hexadecimal, an option invoked here in order to more closely examine the messages. The 20 bytes starting with 0x4500 and ending with 0x9307 are the IP packet header; this is followed by eight bytes of ICMP message header (0x0000-9ca3-1a1a-0000). The remainder of the display shows the contents of the Echo Reply message.
Embedded inside the string of zeroes is the value 0x736b-696c-6c7a. If these characters are interpreted according to International Alphabet 5 (IA5), we retrieve the character string skillz. This is a well-known signature of the Stacheldraht distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) tool. Further analysis of Stacheldraht shows that ICMP Echo Reply messages are the mechanism for communication between the DDoS handlers and agents (Dittrich, 1999) .
This traffic, then, shows a host (doggie) that has been compromised with Stacheldraht.
[root@altamont gck]# tcpdump 'icmp' -x 12:27:09.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 4500 0414 0000 4000 4001 cdf9 c670 431e cc59 9307 0000 9ca3 1a0a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 736b 696c 6c7a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 12:28:00.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 4500 0414 0000 4000 4001 cdf9 c670 431e cc59 9307 0000 9ca3 1a0a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 736b 696c 6c7a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 12:28:10.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 4500 0414 0000 4000 4001 cdf9 c670 431e cc59 9307 0000 9ca3 1a0a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 736b 696c 6c7a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
Listing 7B

Scenario #8
Listing 8A shows a sequence of packet fragments. There are two noteworthy items. First, Echo messages generally contain a small amount of data; 32, 56, and 64 bytes are typical values. This Echo message is clearly much larger. Second, note that the last fragment contains 1480 bytes starting at byte offset 65,120. This would result in an IP packet that is 66,600 bytes in length, greater than the maximum IP packet length of 65,535 bytes. This is the socalled Ping of Death; well-written IP kernels will merely discard the overly long IP packet but weaker implementations will crash the computer when such packets are detected (Insecure.Org, n.d.) . 
Listing 8A
Listing 8B shows another IP fragmentation attack. In this case, the first packet contains the first 36 bytes of a UDP datagram. The second fragment contains the four bytes occupying byte offsets 24-27 in the original packet. Clearly, the second fragment overlaps the first. This is the so-called Teardrop attack; as above, most IP kernels handle this situation one way or another (i.e., they either overwrite the old information or ignore the new information) but weak implementations crash the host computer (CERT, 1998 
Listing 8B
Scenario #9
This listing is one of the author's favorites and is an object lesson for students of TCP/IP. Note that this listing shows well less than a second of a large number of packets between a single pair of hosts; the listing actually went on continuously, at a high rate of speed and volume of data.
In this case, the author was using a host named alabaster. In an effort to observe SSH traffic between two hosts, the author initiated an SSH connection to host altamont.gck.net and then started tcpdump. Starting the packet sniffer, however, generated traffic that needed to be displayed remotely which, in turn, generated even more traffic. Essentially, the author started a self denial-of-service. What is learned is that one must take care when monitoring traffic across remote links. 
CONCLUSION
Most computer forensics examiners and digital investigators enter the field by gaining expertise in computer hardware and software. This is consistent with the historic realm of computer forensics, which used to be totally about examining and analyzing a hard drive that had been removed from a computer.
The growth of network investigations and live traffic acquisition demands that a cadre of examiners be educated in network protocols and their operation. Today, nearly every computer exam needs to include at least the consideration of live data acquisition, be it memory or network traffic. Computers --even at residential scenes --have not been stand-alone devices in some years; awareness of network-attached devices ranging from other computers and wireless devices to printers and additional peripherals is a must in any seizure (Casey, 2004; Nikkel, 2005) . The Internet, of course, is the scene of any number of cybercrimes, network attacks, and other information security events (Kessler & Fasulo, 2007) . And since TCP/IP is the lingua franca of networking, a firm understanding of its functions is essential before examiners can begin to detect and investigate nefarious activity on the local net and the global Net. This paper is neither a TCP/IP tutorial nor a course in intrusion detection and analysis. It is intended to demonstrate the need to pay closer attention to networks and protocols and to whet the appetite of those examiners who are beginning to recognize the need for this skill within their own practices.
